Cyber Incident Response in Social Care: What to Do in the First 24 Hours

December 18, 2025

When a cyber incident hits a social care provider, the first 24 hours are about protecting people, maintaining safe delivery and stabilising the organisation. The incident may present as ransomware, a phishing compromise, loss of system access, suspicious account activity or a sudden IT outage. Whatever the cause, response needs to be structured, calm and operationally-led, with clear governance decisions and a focus on continuity of care.

In practice, cyber incident response links directly to business continuity in tenders and service disruption response, because commissioners will judge providers not only on prevention, but on how quickly they can contain impact, keep people safe and evidence decisions.

Recognise and Declare the Incident Early

One of the most common failure points is hesitation: teams wait for “confirmation” that an event is cyber-related, losing valuable time. A practical approach is to adopt an internal threshold for declaring a suspected cyber incident, such as:

Loss of access to care records or rostering systems across multiple users
Unusual password reset activity or locked accounts
Emails sent from staff accounts without their knowledge
Unexpected encryption messages, ransom notes or disabled antivirus alerts

Declaring an incident does not mean assigning blame; it triggers a controlled process. The duty manager or on-call lead should have authority to initiate the incident plan, notify senior leadership and begin continuity actions.

Containment: Stop the Bleeding Without Causing Harm

Containment decisions should balance IT needs with operational reality. The immediate goal is to prevent wider spread and protect critical systems. Practical containment actions include:

Isolating affected devices (remove from Wi-Fi, unplug network cable) rather than powering off if forensic guidance requires systems to remain on
Resetting compromised credentials through a controlled process, prioritising administrative accounts
Temporarily disabling external access pathways (remote desktop, shared mailboxes, third-party integrations) if suspected as the route of compromise

Operational example: a provider identifies unusual logins to the rostering platform. They immediately suspend external access and switch to a printed rota contingency pack for 24 hours while resetting manager accounts, ensuring staffing remains safe while investigation proceeds.

Care Continuity: Shift to “Safe Mode” Working

Within the first hours, teams should implement a pre-defined “safe mode” approach. This means shifting to the minimum viable process required to deliver safe, person-centred support while digital systems are unavailable. Examples include:

Using last known printed care plans and risk summaries (or emergency paper copies) for priority tasks
Introducing a manual MAR fallback process if eMAR is unavailable, with enhanced double-checks
Centralising incident communications through a single channel (e.g., one phone tree and one brief update schedule)

Operational example: a supported living provider loses access to digital care records overnight. The on-call lead activates a “critical information pack” for each person (key risks, behaviours, medication prompts, emergency contacts) stored securely on-site, and implements additional shift handover checks until systems return.

Governance and Decision Logging

The first 24 hours must generate an evidence trail. Commissioner assurance often comes down to whether decisions were timely, proportionate and recorded. Key governance actions include:

Appointing an incident lead and a deputy (avoid single points of failure)
Starting an incident log with time-stamped decisions and rationale
Holding structured check-ins (e.g., hourly early on, then 2–4 hourly)

Documenting “why” matters as much as “what”. For example: “Disabled remote access at 10:15 to prevent lateral movement following suspected credential compromise; implemented manual call logging to maintain referral response.”

Escalation and External Reporting

Providers should follow internal policies for escalation and external reporting. In the first 24 hours, this typically means:

Notifying senior leadership and initiating governance oversight (e.g., director on call)
Engaging IT support or cyber specialists if in place
Considering whether the incident triggers contractual reporting obligations to commissioners

Commissioners tend to expect early notification where service delivery is affected, even if detail is still emerging. The message should be factual: what’s affected, what mitigations are in place, what risks are being managed, and when the next update will be provided.

Stabilisation: Confirm Priorities for Day Two

By the end of day one, teams should have:

Containment measures implemented
Safe-mode processes in place for core delivery
Governance structure active with a decision log
A plan for system restoration, risk assessment and communications

Operational example: a homecare provider loses access to mobile care apps. They implement paper run sheets for 24–48 hours, increase office-based call monitoring to confirm visit completion, and schedule a daily incident huddle to manage risk and capture assurance evidence.

A strong first 24-hour response does not require perfection. It requires disciplined containment, continuity thinking, and decision-making that can be evidenced under scrutiny.

💼 Rapid Support Products (fast turnaround options)

⚡ 48-Hour Tender Triage
🆘 Bid Rescue Session – 60 minutes
✍️ Score Booster – Tender Answer Rewrite (500–2000 words)
🧩 Tender Answer Blueprint
📝 Tender Proofreading & Light Editing
🔍 Pre-Tender Readiness Audit
📁 Tender Document Review

🚀 Need a Bid Writing Quote?

If you’re exploring support for an upcoming tender or framework, request a quick, no-obligation quote. I’ll review your documents and respond with:

A clear scope of work
Estimated days required
A fixed fee quote
Any risks, considerations or quick wins

📄 Request a Bid Writing Quote →