Digital Safeguarding and Technology-Enabled Harm in Adult Social Care: An Operational Framework

February 9, 2026

Digital safeguarding is no longer a specialist topic. It sits in everyday delivery: phones, messaging, apps, online banking, social media, Wi-Fi access, shared devices, remote monitoring and digital care records. Alongside the benefits, these tools create new routes to harm—coercion, exploitation, financial abuse, harassment, stalking, image-based abuse, scams, and unauthorised access to personal data. This article provides a practical framework for identifying, assessing and managing technology-enabled harm in adult social care, aligned to commissioning assurance and inspection readiness. It should be read alongside the Knowledge Hub resources on digital safeguarding and risk and digital care planning, because digital risk management only works when it is embedded into care planning, reviews and governance.

What counts as technology-enabled harm in adult social care

Technology-enabled harm (sometimes called technology-facilitated abuse) is harm that is enabled, amplified or made easier by digital tools. It can happen to anyone, but people with care and support needs may face additional vulnerability due to social isolation, reduced digital literacy, cognitive impairment, communication needs, or dependency relationships.

In operational terms, services should treat technology-enabled harm as a safeguarding risk category that can sit alongside (and overlap with) domestic abuse, financial abuse, modern slavery, self-neglect and exploitation. Common patterns include:

Coercive control via devices (threats, monitoring, manipulation through messaging, location sharing, or account access).
Financial exploitation (scams, “help” with banking that becomes theft, pressure to share login details, use of contactless cards).
Online grooming and exploitation (including sexual exploitation, forced sharing of images, and threats to disclose).
Harassment and stalking (persistent contact, multiple accounts, doxxing, intimidation).
Data misuse (staff, peers or third parties accessing, sharing or photographing personal information).

The key operational point is this: if a risk can be delivered through a device, your safeguarding system needs to be able to spot it, assess it, and evidence proportionate action.

A practical risk assessment approach that works in real services

Many services struggle because they treat “digital” as a separate risk form. A more reliable approach is to embed digital risk questions inside existing assessment and review structures—initial assessment, ongoing review, safeguarding concern workflow, and behaviour support planning where relevant. At minimum, your assessment framework should cover:

Access and capability: what devices/accounts are used, what support is needed to use them safely, and how capacity is assessed for specific decisions (e.g., sharing images, sending money).
Relationships and contact routes: who has contact, through which platforms, what boundaries exist, and what supervision/oversight is proportionate.
Triggers and vulnerabilities: loneliness, substance use, recent bereavement, desire for connection, learning disability, fluctuating mental health, history of exploitation.
Controls in place: privacy settings, blocked contacts, two-factor authentication, spending limits, device passcodes, Wi-Fi governance, staff practice guidance.
Response readiness: who the person tells if something goes wrong, how staff capture evidence without breaching confidentiality, and escalation thresholds.

This is not about restricting access by default. It is about enabling independence safely through explicit planning, supported decision-making, and proportionate safeguards.

Operational example 1: Online financial exploitation in homecare

Context: A homecare client receives repeated messages on a social platform from someone claiming to be a “friend of a friend”. The client is asked for small transfers to “help with bills”, escalating to requests for bank details. The client is proud of managing their own finances and initially refuses staff support.

Support approach: The service uses a proportionate, rights-based approach: explore the client’s goals (independence), assess decision-specific capacity for money transfers, and agree a support plan that does not remove control but reduces risk. The key is separating “support to decide” from “taking over”.

Day-to-day delivery detail: A senior carer completes a digital risk prompt within the review, documenting the platforms used, the message pattern, and the client’s understanding of scam indicators. Staff support the client to contact their bank to discuss transaction alerts and spending limits, and to enable two-factor authentication. The client chooses to block the contact and tighten privacy settings, with staff present to support but not to control the phone. The service also refreshes staff guidance: carers do not handle bank cards/PINs, but can support calls and signpost. A follow-up visit is scheduled within 72 hours to re-check contact attempts and confirm the client still understands the risk.

How effectiveness is evidenced: Evidence includes a dated risk review entry, the client’s recorded decision and rationale, confirmation of banking safeguards agreed, and follow-up notes showing no further transfers and improved confidence in recognising scams. Governance oversight is demonstrated through the manager’s review and a short learning note shared at team briefing.

Operational example 2: Peer-to-peer harassment in supported living

Context: In a supported living setting, one tenant repeatedly sends threatening voice notes to another tenant after disputes. The recipient becomes anxious, avoids communal areas and reports sleep problems. Staff note the harassing tenant has limited emotional regulation and uses messaging as an outlet.

Support approach: The service treats the issue as safeguarding and tenancy risk, not simply “behaviour”. It uses a dual focus: protect the person experiencing harm while providing targeted support and boundaries for the person causing harm, including behaviour support and tenancy expectations.

Day-to-day delivery detail: Staff capture the concern using the safeguarding workflow, documenting time, platform, and impact. They support the recipient to retain evidence (screenshots/voice notes) without forwarding widely. A keyworker meeting is held the same day with the recipient to update their safety plan: who to contact, options for blocking, and practical adjustments (e.g., quiet space, planned support to use communal areas). For the tenant causing harm, staff use a structured conversation script: clear boundary, expected behaviour, consequences linked to tenancy, and support offered (coping plan, de-escalation strategies). Where appropriate, the service links the issue into a behaviour support plan and records any restrictive practice considerations carefully (e.g., limiting Wi-Fi access is not a default response and must be justified if considered at all).

How effectiveness is evidenced: Evidence includes safeguarding records, updated support plans for both tenants, incident trend data showing reduced frequency, and supervision notes confirming staff followed the agreed approach. The provider evidences proportionality by showing that the first-line controls were blocking, boundaries and support—not blanket restrictions.

Operational example 3: Technology-enabled coercion and “loaned devices”

Context: A person in supported living begins a new relationship. The partner “helps” by providing a new phone but expects constant access and demands passwords “in case of emergency”. Staff notice the person becomes distressed when the phone is not nearby and repeatedly checks messages during support sessions.

Support approach: The service frames this as a potential coercive control risk and applies Making Safeguarding Personal principles: focus on the person’s desired outcomes (relationship, safety, independence) while exploring power dynamics and consent. Decision-specific capacity is considered around sharing passwords and location data.

Day-to-day delivery detail: The keyworker uses a structured digital safety conversation during a planned session, not in a crisis moment. Together they review device settings, account ownership, and whether the person can access support if the phone is removed. Staff support the person to create a separate email account recovery route and to change passwords, explaining the practical consequences (e.g., losing access to messages/photos). A best-interests meeting is not assumed; instead, staff document the person’s understanding and choices, and agree a safety plan: code word for distress, agreed check-ins, and how to contact staff if pressured. If risk escalates, the service is prepared to raise a safeguarding concern and involve partner agencies.

How effectiveness is evidenced: Evidence includes recorded conversations, documented consent/capacity reasoning, a clear safety plan, and review notes. Governance evidence includes manager sign-off where safeguarding thresholds are met and reflective supervision addressing staff confidence in discussing coercion.

Commissioner and inspection expectations you must be able to evidence

Commissioner expectation: Commissioners will expect a provider to evidence a clear safeguarding operating model that includes digital risk—how concerns are identified, triaged, escalated, and reviewed; how learning is captured; and how outcomes are tracked. In practice, this means you should be able to demonstrate: (1) staff know how to record and escalate technology-enabled harm, (2) digital risks are embedded into assessment and reviews, and (3) assurance reporting includes trend themes (e.g., scams, online coercion, device-related disputes) with actions taken.

Regulator / Inspector expectation (CQC): Inspectors will look for safe care that is person-centred, risk-assessed and proportionate. They will expect safeguarding to protect people from abuse while respecting rights and independence, and they will test whether staff understand how to respond, record, and learn. Operationally, your evidence should show: timely action, defensible decision-making, capacity/consent considerations where relevant, and governance oversight (audit, supervision, learning loops) that demonstrates risks are managed—not ignored or “managed” through blanket restrictions.

Governance controls that make digital safeguarding reliable

Digital safeguarding fails when it relies on individual staff confidence. Providers need simple governance controls that make practice consistent:

Standard prompts in assessment/review templates (devices, platforms, contact routes, financial risk, privacy settings, evidence handling).
Incident capture rules that define what to record and how to preserve evidence safely and lawfully.
Audit and supervision focused on quality of recording, proportionality of safeguards, and outcomes for the person.
Learning loops that translate incidents into updated guidance (e.g., scam alerts, device boundary scripts, Wi-Fi governance).
Staff competence checks that test practical skills (privacy settings, two-factor authentication, safe screenshot handling) rather than generic e-learning completion alone.

The aim is not technical perfection. It is a defensible, repeatable safeguarding response that stands up to scrutiny and supports people to live safely with technology.